to whose members' names they had been introduced first. This unexpected finding was initially regarded as likely Type 1 error -a fluke.
Self-report measures of attitude and identification were also used. Unexpectedly, these showed no increase in either liking for or identification with the team of which the subject had become an imagined member. This suggested that IAT measures might be more sensitive to the minimal group effect than were self-report measures.
Preliminary Experiment B A second experiment, using similar procedures, was conducted partly in the hope that its control condition would show no systematic preference for either team. The second experiment sought to replicate Preliminary Experiment A's minimal group effect on the IAT identification measure and, additionally, to determine whether subjects would be able to form an implicit identity bond with a group after first learning to associate that group with failure.
The procedure involved four steps. First, to familiarize subjects with the names and team groupings, subjects learned to associate one set of four names with the Copley team and another set of four names with the Dawson team. Second, to get subjects to treat one team as a winner and the other as a loser, subjects completed an association-formation task based on the IAT's procedures. In this task subjects practiced associating one of the teams with winning and the other with losing (but did not do a second task that switched these associations). Third, to get subjects to identify with one or the other team (the minimal group manipulation) a second IATbased association-formation task was used, this one having subjects practice associating self with either the winning team or the losing team. Fourth and finally, subjects completed the same identification IAT as in Preliminary Experiment A, to provide the test of whether implicit identification with the team of membership (established in the third step) had been influenced by whether that team was associated with winning or losing (in the second step). IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 7 Procedure. The experiment was entirely computer administered, starting with presentation of a list of members' names for the two teams, displayed in a single, centered column with one team above the other. (The detail of one team's name being above the other was not initially expected to be significant.) While looking at the display of eight names, subjects were asked to examine and memorize the names of members for both teams. In order to confirm that they had studied the names, subjects were asked to write the four names for each team from memory.
Subjects next completed three categorization tasks: First, rehearsal of team members' names was done by asking subjects to do a team sorting task, pressing a left-side key when the name of a member of one of the teams appeared in the center of the screen, and a right-side key for each of the other team's members. The second categorization task was intended to establish association of one of the teams with winning. This used a partial IAT procedure, which was introduced by asking subjects to imagine that one of the two teams had won the vocabulary-game competition. To reinforce the association of one team with winning, subjects were asked to give the left-side response for names of members of that team and words representing win (won, winners, success), and the right-side response for names of members of the other team and words representing lose (lost, losers, failure) . During this task reminder labels were visible at the top left of the screen (e.g., "Copley or win") and at the top right (e.g., "Dawson or lose"). The third categorization task, which was intended to associate one of the teams with self -thereby providing the minimal group manipulation -also used a partial IAT procedure. Subjects were asked to imagine being a member of one of the teams and, to learn this, they were asked to give the left-side response for names of members of that team and words representing self (myself, mine, me, self), and the right-side response for names of the other team and words representing other (them, their, they, other) . Again, reminder labels (e.g., "Copley or self") were provided at the upper left and upper right sides of the display. For all three categorization tasks -team IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 8 sorting, association with win/lose, and association with self/other -subjects received immediate feedback (the word "ERROR" in the center of the display) whenever they categorized a name or word incorrectly.
The intended effect of the second and third categorization tasks was to establish, for each subject, an association of self (third task) either with a team that had just been associated with winning or with one that had just been associated with losing (second task). The final task was the same implicit identification IAT that had been used in the Preliminary Experiment A. The purpose of this IAT measure was to observe whether strength of implicit team identification had been influenced by the two prior tasks, which established an ingroup that had previously been associated with either winning or losing. It was expected that subjects might more readily identify with a winning than a losing team, and it was hoped that the IAT would prove sensitive to this.
Results. Results that were apparent midway through data collection made clear that Preliminary Experiment B would not achieve its intended purpose. The experiment was therefore discontinued. The problem was that it proved much easier for subjects to associate the names that they had seen at the top of the very first display screen with winning than with losing.
(Recall that the purpose of that initial display was only to provide subjects the list of all names to be used in the experiment, at which time subjects were asked to memorize both sets of names.)
Averaged over 4 blocks of 40 trials, subjects who were asked to give the same response to the first-listed team and win-related words were more than 100 ms faster than subjects who were asked to give the same response to the first-listed team and lose-related words.
As a consequence of incomplete counterbalancing, the team to be associated with self in the third task was always the one that had been listed at the top on the opening display. For half of the subjects this team had been associated with winning in the second task, and for half it had been associated with losing. The authors erroneously expected that the initial display of names would cause subjects to study and to learn the names of both teams simultaneously and equally.
However, the observation that initial listing order affected ease of association with winning had no plausible interpretation other than that most subjects must have rehearsed the set of names at the top before and/or better than rehearsing those that appeared lower on the screen.
Conclusion from the Preliminary Experiments
In retrospect, the two preliminary experiments supported the conclusion that learning team members' names produced an implicit identification with the team for which members' names were learned first. Although this undermined use of the experiments to test hypotheses relating to the minimal group effect, the possibility of having inadvertently discovered a research model of implicit partisanship -that is, forming an attachment to one of two teams for no apparent reason -made this disappointing outcome quite tolerable. Of course, neither of the two preliminary experiments had been designed to identify the procedure responsible for the observed effects. Plausibly, the unexpected findings could have been due to learning the names of one team's members better than those of the other team, or more simply it might have been due to being exposed to one team's names before the other's (i.e., primacy).
In addition to the serendipitous finding of apparent implicit partisanship, a valuable result of Preliminary Experiment B was its indication that a partial IAT procedure -the procedure that was used for the association with win/lose task -could serve as an experimental dependent measure. Recall that the original purpose of this partial IAT procedure was only to reinforce subjects' associations of one of the two teams with the concept of winning and of the other team with losing. When the latency data for this task showed an effect of the order of the introductory listing of the two teams, its potential usefulness as an experimental dependent measure was immediately apparent. IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 10 Overview of the Main Experiments
The three experiments that follow sought primarily to establish a sufficient cause for the implicit partisanship phenomenon observed in the two preliminary experiments. In the preliminary experiments, learning the names of one team's members was confounded with the order in which the names were encountered. The result of greater liking for the first-encountered team is interesting regardless of whether it was caused by studying and learning the names or by primacy of exposure to them. However, the goal of understanding the effect theoretically can obviously be advanced by identifying the conditions that produce it.
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether studying the names of one team's members, when unconfounded with order of initial exposure to this team's names, would produce an implicit partisanship effect. Experiment 2 was conducted both to replicate Experiment 1's result and to compare the effects of learning a team's members' names with the effects of receiving extra exposures to those names. Experiment 3 provided a stronger comparison of the exposure and name study procedures. Because Preliminary Experiment A had indicated that implicit measures were especially sensitive to the implicit partisanship effect, only implicit measures were used in the three experiments. In particular, the partial IAT procedure of Preliminary Experiment B was adapted to provide dependent measures for both implicit attitude and implicit identification.
Experiment 1:
Effects of Studying Group Members' Names on Attitude and Identification Experiment 1 used the same general format of the two preliminary experiments, starting by acquainting subjects with the names of members of two hypothetical teams. In order to avoid exposing subjects to the collection of names for one team before those of the other, subjects first encountered all of the names individually, twice each, in a random order. Only after those initial exposures were subjects asked to study names for just one team. Effects of studying the names IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 11 on both implicit attitude and identification were then assessed with the partial IAT procedure of Preliminary Experiment B.
Method

Subjects
One hundred sixty seven undergraduate students at University of Washington participated individually, in exchange for optional course credit. Data for 11 of these subjects were not analyzed, including seven whose data were accidentally lost during a changeover of laboratory computers, two others because of equipment failures, and two others who did not complete the experiment. Complete data were available for 156 subjects. Of these, 103 were women, 52 were men, and one did not have information about sex recorded.
Design
The procedure was built around two hypothetical four-person teams, one identified as Purple and the other as Gold. Because these two colors are the University of Washington's school colors, it was expected that there would not be strong pre-experimental preferences for either. There were four between-subjects variables that involved counterbalancing of procedures: (a) studied team (Purple vs. Gold); (b) team associated with self (Purple vs. Gold); (c) team associated with winning (Purple vs. Gold); and (d) order of doing the two tasks of associating the teams with self or other and associating them with winning or losing (self/other first vs. win/lose first).
Procedure
After reading a brief overview of the upcoming experiment's procedures, each subject provided a few items of demographic information on a paper-pencil form and was then seated in a small laboratory room with a desktop computer. The experiment started with a computer-administered consent-to-participate statement, followed by a tutorial version of the categorization task that would be used (with variations) for the remainder of the experiment.
In the tutorial, subjects practiced a classification that was unrelated to any of the subsequent experimental tasks -they were asked to classify snakes versus birds by pressing a left-side key ('D') with left index finger for each snake name, and a right-side key ('L') with right index finger for each bird name. In addition to providing practice at the type of categorization task that would be used in the remainder of the experiment, this task also introduced subjects to the experiment's method of dealing with errors. For any error, the computer immediately displayed "ERROR" in red in the center of the screen and waited for the subject to make the correct response.
For neither the initial tutorial nor for any of the following categorization tasks did the instructions stress responding rapidly. However, the unstated task demand was to produce correct responses quickly. Also, it became obvious to subjects, early in the procedure, that the experiment could take a long time if they responded at a leisurely pace. In all blocks, latencies from stimulus onset to the subject's pressing the key for the correct response were recorded for each trial (this included the time required to change an incorrect response to the correct response). Trials were scored as errors if the subject pressed the incorrect key before pressing the correct one. The interval between pressing a key for the correct response and appearance of the stimulus for the next trial was 150 ms for this and the following categorization tasks. Name study task. Subjects next received instructions that read, in part, Imagine that you live in a dormitory with other students, and that two teams from the dormitory IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 13 Subjects then did a total of 16 trials, during which each of eight names appeared once in each of two groups of eight trials, in random order. Two male and two female names were members of the hypothetical Purple team (Glenda, Laurel, Milton, and Alfred) and four others were members of the Gold team (Janice, Ella, Roland, and Wilbert). As in the preliminary experiments, these uncommon names were used to reduce the likelihood of subjects encountering names of acquaintances. After completing the 16 trials, subjects then proceeded to the name study task, for which the instructions advised that an upcoming team sorting task would "be easier if you memorize the names of the players on one team. The names of the Purple team members will be presented on the following page for 45 seconds. Please try to memorize the names of the members of the Purple team, then we'll continue the task of associating names with teams."
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The names of the four members of just one of the two teams were then displayed as a centered, vertical list that remained on screen for 45 s.
Team sorting task. Subjects next did three blocks of 40 trials of the team sorting task. In each block, the names of the four Gold Team players and the four Purple Team players each appeared 5 times in a quasi-random order in which no name was repeated on consecutive trials and members of the same team did not appear on more than two consecutive trials. Subjects were asked to use these trials to learn to sort the names correctly. They were instructed to press the D (left) key for each name that belonged to the Purple team, and the L (right) key for each name that belonged to the Gold team.
Subjects next proceeded to either the task of associating one of the teams with win and the other team with lose, or to the task of associating one team with self and the other with other.
These tasks both used Preliminary Experiment B's partial IAT procedure in which two associations, each involving two categories of items, were practiced by having the subject respond with the same key to exemplars of both. For example, the association with win/lose task IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 14 could involve subjects responding with the left key for either Purple team names or words related to losing, while also responding with the right key for either Gold team names or words related to winning. All subjects did both the association with win/lose and the association with self/other task. The order of these two tasks was counterbalanced orthogonally to other counterbalancing variables.
Association with win/lose task. The instructions were:
Now we would like you to imagine that the Gold team has won the game. It is important for the experiment that you memorize that the Gold team has won. For the next several categorization blocks, categorize win words such as 'winner' and 'success' with the Gold team, and . . . words such as 'lose' and 'failure' with the Purple team.
The immediately following instructions reminded subjects which key to press for each of the four categories of items, as did positioned labels that remained at the top of the screen during the task. Preparation of data for analysis. Data for the two dependent measures, association with self/other and association with win/lose, were filtered using procedures that have been used routinely for full versions of the Implicit Association Test (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998) . These included (a) recoding latencies under 300 ms to 300 ms and those over 3000 ms to 3000 ms, (b) using latencies from all trials (i.e., including ones on which errors occurred) 5 except for the first two trials of each data-collection block, which tend to have atypically high latencies, and (c) were the ease of associating the studied team with self or other, and with win or lose. Ease of making these associations was measured by latency of response in the partial IAT task. For example, the measure of ease of associating a team with self was provided by subjects who, in the association with self/other task, were asked to give one response to words referring to self and names of that team's members (while at the same time giving another response to words referring to other and the names of the other team's members). IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 16 Analysis of covariance. The experiment included two pre-treatment tasks for which response latencies could be used to predict treatment-unrelated variance in the latency dependent variables. These two preliminary measures were (a) subjects' mean latency in the tutorial categorization task (snake versus bird), and (b) their mean latency in the team sorting task that preceded the tasks that measured association with self/other and association with win/lose.
Analysis of covariance was permissible because analyses of variance of each of the two potential covariates showed no statistically significant main or interaction effects for any of the experiment's independent variables (all F ratios < 1.67, df = 1,152). Further, analysis of covariance was desirable because the covariate-adjusted dependent measures had error variance reduced by the substantial portion of variance that was predictable from the covariates.
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Analyses of covariance will be reported for the series of experiments, including use of adjusted means in bar graphs. With only two exceptions that will be noted, the results to be described using analyses of covariance were also clearly apparent in the corresponding analyses without covariates. The covariance-adjusted data for Experiment 1 appear in Figure 1 .
In order to condense descriptions of results, three simplifications are used here. First, the team for which subjects memorized names will be referred to as the "studied team". Second, the dependent measure tasks will usually be described in terms of just one of the two teams and one of the two concepts involved in the task. For example, the task in which the studied team was associated with self could equally be referred to as the task in which the non-studied team was associated with other. Third, faster responding by subjects who associated the studied team with a concept, compared to the group that associated the non-studied team with that same concept, will be referred to as an "effect favoring the studied team" -that is, an effect indicating stronger association of the studied team (than the non-studied team) with the concept. IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 17 Effect of name study on association with self/other. Figure 1A shows that subjects who associated the studied team with self responded more rapidly than subjects who associated the studied team with other. In the figure, this contrast is collapsed over all counterbalanced procedural variables, none of which was associated with any statistically significant effect. The effect favoring the studied team was a 135 ms difference (871 -736), F(1,138) = 64.5, p = 10 -13 ,
Effect of name study on association with win/lose. Figure 1B shows that subjects who associate the studied team with win responded more rapidly than subjects who associated the studied team with lose. The effect favoring the studied team was a difference of 88 ms (871 -
the type of effect just reported for both dependent measures -faster responding for those associating the studied team's names with self or with winning -will be abbreviated as a namestudy congruence effect. The name-study congruence effect for association with win/lose was smaller than for association with self/other, F(1,138) = 4.97, p = .03, difference in Cohen's d = .50. This difference between effect magnitudes was, however, not statistically significant in the corresponding analysis without covariates -one of the two exceptions (in this article) to the generalization that the same significant effects were found in both analyses with covariates and analyses without covariates.
Effect of the first task's name-study congruence on the second task. Half the subjects did the self/other association task first and half did the win/lose task first. In doing their second association task, half the subjects had previously done the first association task in a name-study congruent form (i.e., associating self or win with the studied team's names) and the remainder had done the first task in a name-study incongruent form (studied team associated with other or lose). This made it possible to test whether name-study congruence of the first test affected IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 18 performance on the second. This analysis yielded two interesting results. First, the name-study congruence effect was still clearly apparent on the task that was done second (averaging 92 ms)
for subjects who had just completed a name-study incongruent first task. Second, there was a significant 3-way interaction effect, indicating that the name-study congruence effect for the second task was especially large (averaging 164 ms, d = 1.47) when subjects did the self/other task first and then did the win/lose task in the same congruence form as for the self/other task.
By contrast, when subjects did the self/other task first and had to switch name-study congruence for the second (win/lose) task, the name-study congruence effect for the win/lose (second) task was especially small (averaging 34 ms, d = .30), 3-way interaction F(1,146) = 5.51, p = . 02. A related effect will be reported in Experiment 3, and these effects will be considered in the General Discussion.
Discussion
Experiment 1 confirmed expectations based on the two preliminary experiments. Studying the names of members of one of two fictitious teams produced effects on both a measure of ease of associating names of that team's members with self and a measure of ease of associating those names with winning. These were large effects (d = 1.29 and d = .79, respectively).
The measure of association with self (versus other) corresponds to the concept of implicit identity (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002) . The measure of association with win (versus lose) corresponds to the concept of implicit attitude. Because the idea of partisanship encompasses both identification with and favorableness toward a group, the finding of name-study congruence effects for both these implicit identity and implicit attitude measures is consistent with using 'implicit partisanship' as a shorthand label for these findings.
Combined with the results of the two preliminary experiments, there seems little doubt that the implicit partisanship effect that results from name study is both substantial and easily IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 19 produced. The finding that the name-study congruence effect was stronger for the self/other measure than for the win/lose measure suggests that the name study procedure has more impact on implicit identity than on implicit attitude. Remarkably, subjects even found it easier to associate the names of the members of the studied team with self than with other after having practiced associating the studied team with losing.
Experiment 1's establishment of name study as a sufficient condition for implicit partisanship is a first step toward theoretical interpretation. In contemplating the remaining work that may be needed to establish a theoretical interpretation, readers might bear in mind that the procedurally simple and empirically well established mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) remains without an established theoretical interpretation after more than 30 years of research, and it was more than 20 before there appeared an explanation -in terms of perceptual fluency (Bernstein, 1989) -that appeared to be a strong candidate. Experiments 2 and 3 sought, in part, to advance theoretical interpretation by trying to relate the new effect to conditions that produce mere exposure effects.
Experiment 2:
Name Study Compared with Extra Exposures to Names Experiment 2 had two purposes: (a) to replicate Experiment 1, and (b) to compare the effect of studying a team's members' names with the effect of receiving extra repeated exposures to the names. Experiment 2 had two conditions, a name study condition that exactly replicated Experiment 1, and an exposure condition that, in place of the name study procedure, gave subjects extra exposures to the names of members of one team.
Subjects
Seventy-three undergraduate students at the University of Washington participated individually, in exchange for optional course credit. Data for nine of these subjects were not analyzed, including seven whose data exhibited excessively long latencies and two who were later IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 20 discovered to have participated previously in an experiment that used similar tasks. Complete data were analyzed for 64 subjects (44 women and 20 men).
Procedure Name study condition. This condition exactly replicated Experiment 1. As a reminder, the name study procedure had two components: (a) first, a brief sorting task in which all eight names were presented twice, accompanied by arrows that indicated whether each was to be classified with the Purple team (arrow pointing left) or the Gold team (arrow pointing right), and (b) next, the instruction to spend 45 s studying the names of four members of one of the two teams.
Exposure condition. The exposure condition differed as little as possible from the name study condition, by replacing the 45-s period of name study with an exposure task that presented names of members of one team four times as often as those of the other team. The instructions for the exposure task started just as did those for the name study task: "Imagine that you live in a dormitory with other students, and that two teams from the dormitory play a vocabulary game once a week to improve their vocabularies . . . ." The instructions continued: "To help you learn the names of the students who will be playing the game, we will have you categorize the names based on whether they are male or female. You will be shown a series of names. Please categorize each name according to whether it is a male or female name." Subjects were asked to press the left key for male names and the right key for female names. There followed a single block of 40 trials that presented the names of each of the four members of one of the teams twice, and the names of each of the four members of the other team eight times. Each team consisted of two male names and two female names. At the time that this exposure task was done, subjects
did not yet know the team affiliations (Purple or Gold) for any of the names.
In both conditions, the first task after the treatment (name study or exposure) was the team sorting task, consisting of three blocks of trials in which subjects practiced assigning the eight IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 21 names correctly to the Purple team and the Gold team. This was followed by either the win/lose task (associating one team with winning and the other team with losing) or the self/other task (associating one team with self and the other team with other), and then the remaining one of these two tasks. Preparation of data for analyses was the same as for Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The two covariates used for Experiment 1, mean latency in the tutorial task and mean latency in the team sorting task that preceded the dependent measures, were both available in Experiment 2.
However, analysis of variance of the tutorial measure showed a significant effect of one design factor. This was necessarily Type 1 error, because no independent variable treatments had been administered prior to the tutorial task. Accordingly, only the team sorting measure was used as a covariate in the analyses to be reported.
Effect of Name study (Replication of Experiment 1) Figure 2 provides the data for the name study condition. As in Experiment 1, subjects who were asked to associate the studied team with self responded more rapidly than those who were asked to associate the studied team with other. This effect favoring the studied team was a 147 ms difference (891 -744), F(1,15) = 16.6, p = .001, d = 1.46. Similarly, subjects who were asked to associate the studied team with win responded 152 ms more rapidly (882 -730) than did those who were asked to associate the studied team with lose, F(1,15) = 24.5, p = .0002, d = 1.61.
Like Experiment 1, the name-study congruence effect was clearly apparent on the second association task (averaging 142 ms) even for subjects who had immediately before that performed a name-study incongruent task. Experiment 2 did not replicate Experiment 1's finding that the effect of name study was greater on implicit identification (association with self) than on implicit valence (association with winning). To the contrary, the effect on implicit valence was very slightly larger. Also unlike Experiment 1, there were no significant effects of IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 22 name-study congruence of the first task on magnitude of the name-study congruence effect for the second task.
Effect of Extra Name Exposures
There It is, of course, not appropriate to accept the null hypothesis for either measure. However, only the effect of exposure on the win/lose measure was large enough to prompt suspicion that an experiment with greater power might have found it to be statistically significant.
Effects of Name Study versus Effects of Exposure
The name study treatment produced a stronger effect on the measure of implicit association with self (147 ms) than did the exposure treatment (-5 ms), F(1,31) = 7.29, p=.01. The name study treatment also produced a stronger effect on the measure of association with winning (152 ms) than did the exposure treatment (89 ms). However, this latter difference was not statistically significant, F(1,31) = 0.44, p=.51.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1's implicit partisanship effect -the benefit of studying a team's members names on subsequently associating that team either with winning or with self.
Experiment 2 did not replicate an interesting secondary finding from Experiment 1 -that studying a team's names has a greater effect on implicit identify than on implicit attitude. It will be appropriate to examine this comparison again in Experiment 3 before venturing a conclusion.
Where Experiment 2 fell short of expectations was in shedding light on the possible relationship of the implicit partisanship effect to the well-established mere exposure effect. The problem was that no mere exposure effect was obtained. The higher exposure level consisted of IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 23 six more exposures to each of the four names for one team. Because repeated exposure effects often reach their maximum at relatively small numbers of exposures (Bornstein, 1989) , it may have been a mistake to expect the added six exposures of each name to make a difference. Also, the extra exposures of names in Experiment 2's exposure condition occurred in the context of subjects being asked to classify the names by sex. This differed from the procedures of most mere exposure experiments, which have not asked subjects to make judgments or other responses to repeatedly exposed stimuli. Nevertheless, exposure effects have occurred in experiments that provided exposures in the context of judgment tasks (e.g., Seamon et al., 1995) .
Even though the exposure treatment did not work as expected, the finding of greater effects for name study than for exposure on both measures, and the finding that this difference was statistically significant for the implicit identification measure, strongly suggested that the effect of the name study procedure is not due just to the exposure to names that it provides.
Experiment 3:
Name Study Opposed to Extra Exposures to Names Experiment 2 both replicated the implicit partisanship effect and found that effect to be considerably stronger than the effect of extra exposures to one team's names. However, the exposure condition of Experiment 2, which compared the effect of 4 versus 10 initial exposures to names on liking for the group associated with those names, was not a very powerful one.
Experiment 3 re-examined the effect of repeated exposures with both a stronger exposure manipulation and a procedure that allowed exposure and implicit partisanship effects to work in opposition. An added feature of Experiment 3 was a condition designed to determine whether the implicit partisanship effect (a) was attached entirely to the originally studied names that established the effect, or (b) was attached also to the group to which those names belonged. This was done by introducing, late in the experiment, a new set of names that were presented as other members of the same group. Finding that the effect extends to these new names would show that the effect was attached to the group as a generalized entity, rather than just to the group's original members.
Method Subjects
One hundred four undergraduate students at the University of Washington participated individually, in exchange for optional course credit. Data for eight of these were not analyzed, including four whose data included excessively large error rates, indicating that they may not have understood one or more of the tasks, and four others whose data were redundant -three whose places in the counterbalancing design had already been filled and a fourth who was later discovered to have participated in the experiment twice. (For the last subject, data for the first participation were analyzed.) The final group of 96 subjects included 61 women and 35 men.
Procedure
As with the previous two experiments, Experiment 3 used a procedure in which subjects participated individually at computers, and were introduced to the imagined situation of a student dormitory in which teams gathered regularly to play a vocabulary game. The procedures for all conditions started with the same tutorial task of the previous experiments, in which subjects practiced categorizing snakes vs. birds. The vocabulary game scenario was then described, after which the three conditions diverged.
Three sets of relatively unfamiliar female and male names constituted the teams used in the experiment. The Purple (Janice, Laurel, Milton, Arthur) and Gold (Glenda, Lucille, Duncan, Roland) teams were always opposed in the final two tasks that provided the implicit identity and implicit attitude dependent measures. A third team (Margot, Daphne, Harlan, Willard) had a supporting role in each condition. The following descriptions are stated as if all subjects studied IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 25 the names of players on the Purple team. In the counterbalanced design, however, the studied names were equally often those of the Gold team.
Study before exposure condition. After learning about the weekly vocabulary game, subjects were asked to spend 45 s studying the names of players on the Purple team. They next practiced distinguishing the members of the Purple and Gold teams. This team sorting practice consisted of two blocks of 40 trials in which the eight names of the two teams' players were presented in quasi-random order, with instructions to press the left key for each Purple team name and the right key for each Gold team name. The name of each member of both teams appeared 10 times in these two blocks. Next, a procedure that gave subjects substantial additional exposure to the names of players on the Gold (non-studied) team started with these instructions:
We want you to become familiar with the names of ALL of the students who will be playing the Vocabulary Game. To help you learn the names of the students who will be playing the Vocabulary game, we will have you categorize the names based on whether they are MALE or FEMALE.
Subjects then practiced sorting eight names as male or female, by pressing one key for male and the other for female. The eight names included the four Gold team players and the four players on the extra (third) team. The names of the Purple team's players did not appear in this block. In this fashion, subjects received 10 additional exposures to each of the names for the Gold team, intended to counter the effect of the single 45-s exposure to the names of the Purple team's players in the name study procedure. The tasks then continued with the two dependent measures (described later).
Exposure before study condition. In this condition the practice in classifying names by sex, which gave extra exposures to the Gold team's members preceded (rather than followed) both the 45-s name study for the Purple team and the team sorting practice. Putting the exposure procedure before name study was intended to give the extra exposures whatever added benefit might be due to primacy.
Name substitution. A still greater effect of exposure was expected in the third condition, which was mostly identical to the exposure before study condition. However, in place of the 45-s study of the Purple team's names, subjects in the name substitution condition studied the names of the extra team's players, while being told that these were the players of the Purple team. This name study was followed by the instructions for the team sorting practice. However, before doing the team sorting task, subjects encountered these instructions:
For the purposes of this experiment, it is necessary to introduce new players to the game. Without any introduction to the new Purple team names -which, at this point, could be identified only by their unfamiliarity due to lack of prior appearance in the experiment -the subjects proceeded with two blocks of 40 trials each, classifying the names of the Purple and Gold team players. As a consequence of this sequence of procedures, subjects in the name substitution condition both (a) had 10 exposures to the names of each Gold team player before encountering any of the Purple team's players' names, and (b) never received the 45-s exposure to Purple team names received by subjects in the other two conditions. Dependent measures. The procedure for measuring implicit identity (association with self relative to other) and implicit attitude (association with win relative to lose) differed from those for Experiment 2 in only one respect: Subjects were asked to associate the same team with self as with winning. For half the subjects, the team to be associated with self and winning was the studied team. For the remainder, the team to be associated with self and winning was the team that had more name exposures. Half of the subjects in each condition did the implicit identity (self/other) task first, and the remainder did the implicit attitude (win/lose) task first.
Results
Experiment 3 had three potential covariates for analyzing the main two dependent measures.
These were the latency measures from (a) the tutorial task (classifying snakes versus birds), (b) the exposure task of classifying names by sex, and (c) the team sorting task of classifying names as belonging to the Purple or Gold team. However, the tutorial task measure was not useful as a covariate because it was uncorrelated with the dependent measures, and the sex-classification task could not be used as a covariate because it showed two statistically significant effects of design factors. The following analyses therefore used only the subject's mean latency for the team sorting task as a covariate. Figure 3 presents the data for the study before exposure and exposure before study conditions.
Effects of Name Study versus Exposure
Both of these conditions contrasted the effect of a 45 s period of study of the names of one team with the effect of 10 extra exposures to the names of the other team. Because results did not differ for these two conditions, they are combined in Figure 3 . It is apparent in Figure 3 that the 45-s period of name study was much the more potent procedure in causing subjects to rapidly classify names together with self (rather than other) or with winning (rather than losing). The effect favoring the studied team on the self/other task was a 172 ms difference (881 -709), In addition to the results that appear in Figure 3 , two other findings emerged from analysis of the two name study conditions. First, subjects were generally faster on the dependent measures when exposure preceded name study than when name study came first. This result, which was statistically significant in the analysis of covariance but not the analysis of variance (the second of the two such discrepancies in the present research), is not easily interpretable. Fortunately, it does not qualify the results shown in Figure 3 . Second, there was an effect of the order in which the two dependent measures were done. The name-study congruence effect (greater speed of associating studied names with self or with winning) on the first measure was stronger when the first measure was association with self/other (232 ms) than when it was association with win/lose 
Effects of Substitution for Studied Names versus Exposure
In the name substitution condition, immediately after the name study procedure the four studied names were replaced with previously unseen names. Subjects then practiced classifying the four substitute names and the four names previously used for the sex classification task into their respective (Purple and Gold) teams, before completing the two dependent measure tasks. Two opposed expectations for the name substitution condition were either (a) that the implicit partisanship effect due to name study would be inherited by the substitute names, thereby
showing that the effect occurred for the group, rather than -or in addition to -occurring just for individual studied names, or (b) that a mere exposure due to substantially greater exposure to the other set of names would overpower any implicit partisanship effect. IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 29 The results revealed neither the inherited effect of name study nor the exposure effect. This could mean either (a) that neither effect occurred, or (b) that both effects occurred at approximately equal levels. An observation supporting the conclusion that neither effect occurred was the generally much slower latencies for the name substitution condition than for the other two conditions. Compared to the four means shown in Figure 3 , the corresponding four means in the name substitution condition averaged between 28 and 213 ms slower.
Discussion
In summary of Experiment 3, the implicit partisanship effect of Experiments 1 and 2 was again observed at strong levels in the two conditions that used the name study procedure. Further, and also in support of results obtained in Experiment 1, the name-study congruence effect on the ordinally first dependent measure was noticeably stronger when that first measure was association with self/other than when it was association with win/lose. The observation that the effects on the second dependent measure showed exactly the reverse pattern -greater name-study congruence for win/lose than for self/other -can be understood in terms of Experiment 3's design that always associated the same team with self and win. This meant that the subjects who strongly associated the studied team with self on the first dependent measure showed a similarly strong tendency to associate that same team with winning on the second measure. Contrastingly, subjects who (not so strongly) associated the studied team with winning on the first measure showed a similar not-so-strong tendency to associate the studied team with self on the second measure. A possible interpretation is that associating the studied team with self on the first measure may have reinforced the implicit partisanship effect, such that it was also observed strongly on the subsequent test for association with winning.
General Discussion IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 30 The three experiments consistently showed that spending 45 s studying a group of names led to both greater ease of associating those names with the concept of self than with the concept of other and greater ease of associating the names with the concept of winning than with the concept of losing. This result has been labeled implicit partisanship.
Interpretation of the Dependent Measures as Implicit Partisanship
Justification for the implicit partisanship label requires (a) that the latency dependent measures used in the research are valid indicators of the two components of partisanship -identification with a group and positive attitude toward that group, and (b) that this partisanship can be interpreted as implicit -i.e., the actor lacks awareness of its causes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) . definition of the basic constructs of social cognition (attitude, stereotype, self-concept, and selfesteem) in terms of associations between concepts (such as self, groups, and attitude objects) and attributes (including valence). Greenwald and Nosek (2001) reviewed evidence for validity of IAT measures (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001) , summarizing approximately 30 studies, most of which supported the construct validity of association-strength interpretations of IAT measures.
A possible basis for concern about the implicit attitude measures of the present studies is that, instead of using a diverse set of words with positive and negative valence, they used words representing the specific concepts of winning and losing. Nevertheless, the measure obtained with these stimuli is reasonably interpreted as a measure of attitude (i.e., association with valence) because positive versus negative valence is what distinguishes winning from losing. IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 31 Also, recall that Preliminary Experiment A's results were obtained with a full IAT measure that used the standard (diverse) set of valenced stimulus items.
IAT measures are considered implicit because they do not rely on subjects being aware of the causes of the associations revealed by the measures. Also supporting the implicit label is the observation that subjects in the two preliminary experiments gave no indication of partisanship on self-report measures.
Is the Effect Stronger on Implicit Identity than Implicit Attitude?
In Experiment 1, the name study procedure had a stronger effect on implicit identity than on implicit attitude. In Experiment 3, implicit partisanship effects were stronger for subjects who were tested first on associations with self/other (i.e., identity) than for those tested first on associations with win/lose (i.e., attitude). Although both of these findings suggested that the name study procedure had a stronger or more direct effect on identity than on attitude, clarity of the evidence for that conclusion was reduced considerably by Experiment 2's lack of a similar finding. In seeking further evidence, data from Experiment 2 were examined to determine whether differential effects on the two measures could be observed in the very first block of trials that followed the name study manipulation. This analysis showed that, indeed, the implicit partisanship effect was larger for the identity measure (mean = 150 ms) than for the attitude measure (mean = 124 ms). However, this relatively small difference between magnitudes of the two effects was far from being statistically significant (F < 1). Any conclusion about implicit partisanship occurring more strongly on measures of identity than on measures of attitude must await more decisive evidence.
Difference of Implicit Partisanship from Minimal Group and Mere Exposure Effects IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 32 In common with the minimal group effect (Tajfel et al., 1971) , the implicit partisanship effect involves both identification with and attitudinal attachment to a group. The main difference between the two effects is that identification with a group is part of the procedure that produces the minimal group effect (i.e., it is part of the independent variable manipulation), whereas identification is a dependent measure in the implicit partisanship experiment.
In common with the mere exposure effect, the implicit partisanship effect involves attraction resulting from exposure to a set stimuli. Further, both effects share the characteristic that this attraction appears 'for no reason'. 8 Nevertheless, three differences between the mere exposure effect and the implicit partisanship effect suggest that they are psychologically different. First, the mere exposure effect involves stimuli that are presented individually, whereas stimuli are presented as a group for the implicit partisanship effect. Second, the mere exposure effect occurs most strongly when multiple exposures are separated in time (Bornstein, 1989) , whereas the implicit partisanship effect (as implemented in the present research) involves a single, sustained exposure. Third, although both effects are observed on attitude measures, the implicit partisanship effect occurs additionally on a measure of association with self.
Further indication that the implicit partisanship effect differs from the mere exposure effect comes from results of present Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2, the name study condition had a strong effect on the dependent measures, and the mere exposure condition had little or no effect. In Experiment 3, repeated exposure and name study procedures were put into opposition, with the clear finding that name study had the stronger effect. Both of these results suggest that conditions conducive to the implicit partisanship effect are not the same as those conducive to the mere exposure effect. If the mere exposure and implicit partisanship effects have a common basis in exposure to the stimuli, then a minimal expectation for Experiment 3 was that the exposure effect should at least have matched the name study effect, rather than being strongly overpowered by it.
Relations to Natural Social Phenomena
Although the search for a laboratory implicit partisanship effect was initially inspired by natural observations (see Introduction), the present laboratory procedure lacks obvious similarity to natural social phenomena. This circumstance should not be considered a disaster. That is, the laboratory implicit partisanship effect can have value in exploring theoretical questions even if it lacks superficial similarity to natural occurrences of implicit partisanship (cf. Mook, 1983 ).
Nevertheless, the laboratory implicit partisanship effect will have even greater value if it can be tied to natural phenomena. This thought prompted reversing the question with which this research started. The original question was, "How can implicit partisanship be investigated in the laboratory?" The reversed question is, "Are there natural phenomena that resemble the laboratory implicit partisanship effect?"
Typically, we know more names of people in groups with which we identify than in groups with which we do not identify. For example, sports enthusiasts typically know names of the members of their preferred teams better than those of other teams. As a thought experiment, imagine that the entire rosters of two teams in the same city (such as baseball's New York
Yankees and New York Mets) were suddenly switched. Now consider the case of pre-switch supporters of either team. After the switch, which team will they prefer? Perhaps many allegiances would switch.
Most people know the names of historical and currently popular figures from their own country much better than those from any other country. It is plausible that either (a) learning these names was motivated by a pre-existing national identity, or (b) the same experiences that produced national identity also led to better knowledge of the names. By comparison, a third possibility, that (c) attachment (i.e., partisanship) is a consequence of better knowledge of the names -may seem implausible. However, the present research encourages taking this third possibility seriously.
The present research also suggests the possibility of applying the implicit partisanship effect in the area of international attitudes. For example, a newly established country might be wise to mount an information campaign directed at educating audiences (perhaps both domestic and foreign) about the names of its leading personalities and its major place names. Likewise, a country that is hosting an international Olympic competition might use the intensive media focus to advertise its place names and its historical figures. Related to these suggestions, is it possible that the many name changes of political entities in eastern Europe and Africa make it difficult for outsiders (and perhaps even insiders) to feel attachment to those regions? Further, might the strategies just suggested for a newly established country also work well for other newly established entities, such as corporations?
A Mere Categorization Effect?
The preceding thoughts about sports teams and international attitudes perhaps seem more related to the mere exposure effect than to the implicit partisanship effect. However, the justdiscussed natural situations involve exposures to sets of stimuli that are related by a shared category membership. This is an important difference from mere exposure effects, in which the repeatedly exposed items either (a) do not have a shared category or group membership, or (b) are members of the same category as unexposed control items (such as Chinese characters, random polygons, or abstract art works). The shared category or group membership property of items that benefit from the name study procedure is central enough to the implicit partisanship effect to suggest the possibility of conceiving the effect instead as a mere categorization effect. IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 35 Several recent IAT experiments provide additional basis for suggesting that mere category membership carries attitudinal benefits. Rothermund and Wentura (2001) reported results indicating that nonwords (which lacked category membership) were evaluatively more negative than the neutral words (members of the category, words). Somewhat more surprisingly, Brendl, Messner, and Markman's (2001) findings suggested that nonsense items (pronounceable nonwords that had no category membership) were attitudinally more negative than the category, insect names. In both of these studies, the nonword items could be regarded as evaluatively handicapped, in mere exposure terms, by their unfamiliarity. However, it is also possible that they were handicapped by their lack of category membership. Both Ashburn-Nardo et al. (in press) and Gregg (2000) have shown that pronounceable nonwords can acquire implicit positive valence that is detectable by IAT measures -after subjects learn to categorize these items into a group. These several findings all point toward the conclusion that there is an implicit evaluative benefit of category membership. 9 This possible evaluative benefit of mere categorization also fits with longstanding conceptions of the value of mental categories (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957) .
The above observations notwithstanding, the present evidence for a mere categorization effect is at best suggestive and circumstantial. Furthermore, characterization of the present research's name study procedure as 'mere' categorization is arguable, because the procedure included details that exceeded simple learning of a new category -specifically, it included the use of a fictitious scenario involving competition between imaginary teams and the request that subjects imagine that they lived in the same dormitory with members of the two teams. It is clearly appropriate to consider other interpretations. One alternative that merits consideration comes from research on 'mere ownership', which shows that taking possession of an object increases the object's perceived value (Beggan, 1992; Feys, 1991; Kahneman, Knetsch, & IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 36 Thaler, 1990). Studying the set of names might be conceived as taking mental ownership of them. A virtue of this interpretation is its built-in explanation for the association-with-self component of implicit partisanship -ownership is an association with self (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, pp. 11-12) .
Conclusion
The In operationalizing 'social categorization', Tajfel made subjects members of a group for which no individuating information about other members was available. The present name study procedure was almost exactly complementary. The 45-s name study procedure provided individuating information (names) about four members of a group with which subjects had no membership relation.
Many regard the lesson of the minimal group effect as discouraging, because it reveals that simple membership in a group plants seeds of intergroup conflict. The lesson of the implicit partisanship effect may be more encouraging -the effect establishes that knowledge about a group of which one is not a member can plant seeds of attraction to that group.
1. A standard form of research report tells of theoretical inspiration followed by research efforts that culminate in the report of predicted results. This article tells of unpredicted results followed by research efforts that culminate in an unanticipated theoretical inspiration. This reversed sequence may occur more often than is apparent, possibly because researchers do not readily admit to such glaring lack of foresight. The reason for reporting this work in its actual sequence may be less a compulsion to tell the truth than an indication of the authors' inability to construct, within the standard research-story form, any plausible scenario that could produce the procedure of the central independent variable.
2. The IAT turned out to be successful for this purpose, even though, as will be seen, not in the expected fashion. Recently, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, and Monteith (in press) have independently demonstrated the usefulness of the IAT as a dependent measure for the minimal group procedure.
3. Procedures used for the IAT are not described in detail here, but -except for using smaller numbers of trials -were based closely on those introduced by Greenwald, et al. (1998) .
4. At any place in instructions in which a team's color is mentioned, use of the colors Purple and
Gold was counterbalanced as stated in the Design paragraph. To keep the text comprehensible, readers will not be repeatedly reminded of these counterbalancing variations in describing instructions, etc.
5. At the request of a reviewer, all analyses for Experiment 1 were repeated on a data set for which error trials were omitted. The covariance-adjusted mean latencies for treatments shown in Figure 1 were unchanged in this analysis and values of F ratios were affected only in minor fashion, not altering any conclusions. The four statistically significant F ratios reported in the following Results section are, respectively, of 64.5, 24.0, 4.97, and 5.51. For the corresponding IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 40 analyses without error trials, these four F ratios were, respectively, 73.4, 30.0, 4.76, and 5.51.
Despite some of the latter F ratios being larger, the analyses including error trials were retained because this has been standard procedure in research using the IAT.
6. As an example of noise reduction by the logarithm transformation, analyses of covariance in Experiment 1 accounted for 62.5% and 64.7% of variance of the main dependent measures when done with untransformed data, compared with 67.4% and 69.2% when done with logtransformed data.
7. To illustrate the effects of using covariates: Analyses of the two log-transformed dependent measures without covariates accounted for 23.9% and 16.2% of variance. With the two covariates added, the percentages of dependent measure variance accounted for were 67.4% and 69.2%, respectively.
8. This is in contrast with the minimal group effect, in which attraction or favoritism has some rational basis in expectations of reciprocal favoring among those who share a group membership (e.g., Gaertner & Insko, 2000) .
9. Both Brendl et al. (in press ) and Rothermund and Wentura (2001) offered nonassociative interpretations of their findings. Their preferred interpretations do not imply an evaluative benefit of mere categorization. IMPLICIT PARTISANSHIP Feb 7, 2002 Page 41 Figure Captions
1. Mean latencies for dependent measures of Experiment 1. Subjects performing the task that required giving the same response to names studied at the beginning of the experiment and words referring to self responded more rapidly than those who had to give the same response to studied names and words referring to other (left panel). Similarly, associating the studied names with win was easier (more rapid) than associating them with lose (right panel). Error bars are standard deviations.
2. Mean latencies for the name study condition of Experiment 2, which replicated Experiment 1.
Again, names were classified much more rapidly when the task was to associate studied names with self or win than with other or lose. Error bars are standard deviations. A B Figure 3 
